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Fortress Europe or Pace-Setter? 
Identity and Values in an Integrating Europe
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Abstract:
The article represents a contribution to discussions about the basis, motives, and goals of European 
integration stimulated by the recent “normative turn” in EU studies. My aim is threefold: By addressing the 
issue of internal legitimacy in EU decision-making, I wish to show that the European Union is in need of 
a public “story” of European integration; however, a closer analysis suggests that there is much normative 
disagreement on the values and principles that are supposed to define such “Europeanness”. This is 
also relevant for Europe’s role within the scene of international or global politics, where the EU aspires to 
become a leading actor or is supposed to do so by cosmopolitan-minded authors. Lastly, the text defends 
the usefulness of the traditional conceptual apparatus of political theory, which has – in relation to European 
integration – in recent times come under attack.
Key Words: European integration, European identity, normative turn in EU studies, legitimacy, common 
values, affective dimension of citizenship, cosmopolitanism, European foreign policy
The Lisbon Treaty, an heir to the rejected Constitutional Treaty, is a firm step in the direc-
tion of a politically integrated Europe – a sui generis type of body politic that is meant to 
supersede the existing model of a territorially defined sovereign state.1 For the purpose of 
this article, I will take the European Union as a model case of “transnational level” political 
functioning, as distinguished from the national and global levels. Such an approach allows for 
a dual but complementary perspective: On the one hand, the view “from below” addresses the 
motives and goals of European integration, as well as the question of what holds (or is sup-
posed to hold) European diversity together. On the other hand, the view “from above” consid-
ers the place of “Europe” in the wider scheme of transnational/global politics, and puts such 
considerations in the context of post-national and cosmopolitan political theorizing. 
The article starts by delineating the concept of legitimacy, and argues that affective iden-
tification with an overarching political authority – which the EU is lacking – represents an 
essential component of the legitimate and stable exercise of power. While a source of such 
identification, captured also by the notion of trust, is traditionally supplied by nationhood, 
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a similar source is lacking on the EU level. The article proceeds to question the existence of 
common European values and the suggested ease of constructing a shared European iden-
tity. Aside from the most general conceptual (“declaratory”) level, there is a great deal of 
normative disagreement on what values and principles should define Europe both “inwards” 
and “outwards”. This should preclude both the uncritical “great European narratives” so fre-
quently found in official documents and statements, and overly optimistic views regarding the 
leading cosmopolitan role of integrated Europe. In general, the text represents an implicit plea 
for retaining the traditional conceptual apparatus of political theory, which in recent times has 
increasingly come under attack.
1. Deficits of Legitimacy and the Need for Normative Argument
Such a mode of inquiry follows what has been termed the “normative turn in EU stud-
ies”, which denotes a shift from a performance-based or “pragmatic” perspective towards 
a “strategic-oriented action or normative argument concerning the purpose, underlying values, 
future shape and desirable structures of what Jacques Delors once called ‘un object politique 
non-identifié’”, as Bellamy and Castiglione (2003: 8) put it. Much in this normative argument 
depends on the concept of legitimacy, which, in turn, might raise questions about common 
values and identity as forming a necessary precondition.2
Although the concept of legitimacy belongs to the traditional apparatus of political theory, 
concerned predominantly with the liberal-democratic state as the basic unit of reference, it 
seems to be equally valid for the emerging Euro-polity.3 Or at least a strong case could be 
made that this ought to be so – that “the criteria of liberal-democratic legitimacy are indeed 
appropriate for the EU level” (Beetham and Lord 1998: 3; cf. Ch. 1). As such, the concept 
should escape the charge of backward-looking attitudes towards the EU, which has been lev-
elled against authors such as Larry Siedentop for applying “sociological and philosophical 
dogmas two centuries old” and requiring the EU to conform to “the same democratic stand-
ards as its member states” (Moravcsik 2001: 116; cf. Siedentop 2001). What Siedentop and 
similarly-minded authors try to defend is a need for certain common foundation that would 
ensure the legitimacy, acceptability and consecutively stability of the EU. In other words, they 
search for a sociological substrate, a kind of European demos which, as a “primary source of 
law”, traditionally forms the basis of democratic legitimacy for the given polity (cf. Belling 
2008: 245).
Following Bellamy and Castiglione, it is useful to distinguish the internal and external as-
pects of legitimacy, as well as two dimensions upon which they bear – polity and regime. Our 
concern here is with the internal legitimacy of the EU – “the ways people within any organi-
zation, including a state, relate to each other and to the institutions governing their lives” – 
because there is little dispute that the proposed criteria of external legitimacy, concerning 
if and how institutions satisfy certain “formal and substantive norms”, are readily met.4 
According to the authors, the traditional theoretical approaches to European integration – 
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism – tend to assume (in the pragmatic/
performance-based vein) that external legitimacy somehow entails the fulfilment of criteria 
for internal legitimacy, which is doubtful; neither the neofunctionalist spill-over mechanism 
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nor the values of ever-increasing peace and prosperity can do the job of justifying (or legiti-
mising) a specific model of the European polity, and even less of a particular regime that fills 
the polity with substance. Confusing external with internal legitimacy, as well as the polity and 
regime dimensions, leaves many important issues beyond theoretical reflection, especially the 
regime criteria that (1) its institutions in their scope and style(s) “recognize ideals, interests 
and identities of governed”, as well as that (2) “collective decisions [are] seen as authoritative 
because [they] involve mutual recognition” (Bellamy and Castiglione 2003: 11). These issues 
loosely correspond with what has been termed the cultural and democratic deficits of the EU 
(Delanty 2007), and it is exactly at this point that the “normative turn” in EU studies gains its 
momentum.
When the authors claim that the “broad consensus [on the external criteria of polity and re-
gime] does not in itself generate any particular allegiance to the EU” (Bellamy and Castiglione 
2003: 14), they in fact hint to a related issue which they do not explicitly address but which 
extends their argument to the specific outputs of EU decision-making. Andreas Føllesdal in 
this sense distinguishes, on the one hand, the normative legitimacy of a given polity and/or 
regime, which roughly corresponds to the various dimensions identified by Bellamy and Cas-
tiglione, and on the other, a more demanding condition of political obligation to abide by the 
individual commands of the political authority. This second criterion (or condition) requires, 
on the part of the citizens, “trust in the future compliance of other citizens and authorities 
with such commands and regimes”, and conversely, trustworthiness of institutions and fellow 
citizens (Føllesdal 2006: 457). Føllesdal notes that this can be, following David Easton, re-
stated as a distinction between diffuse and specific support for (and perhaps compliance with) 
a given polity/regime, where the diffuse kind of support – which stems from abstract values 
and objectives, rather than specific policy outcomes – is much strengthened by the citizens’ 
believing that they have a common good which the authorities seek to promote (ibid: 451). 
Two points are worth stressing: First, universal principles such as human rights, solidarity 
and rule of law offer little guidance as to what kind of regime should be in place, as well as 
which particular policies might be accepted by the citizens. Second, some of the “standard 
normative principles” contained in the apparatus of traditional political theory seem still 
perfectly appropriate to be applied to the Euro-polity, notwithstanding its complex and sui 
generis nature.
Føllesdal frames his discussion in broader terms and distinguishes four specific concep-
tions of legitimacy, all of which are normatively relevant:5 Legitimacy as (1) legality, which 
overlaps with the external aspect of legitimacy outlined above; (2) compliance, which covers 
both the question of internal legitimacy and political obligation in particular cases; (3) prob-
lem solving, which corresponds with the intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist pragmatic 
and/or performance-based outlook, such as achieving peace and prosperity in Europe, and fi-
nally (4) justifiability, which most closely alludes to a political-philosophical account of what 
citizens of the European Union’s member-states would consent to in a hypothetical contractual 
situation. Moreover, there are different channels of granting legitimacy available, including 
participation, democratic rule, actual consent and output (ibid: 445–450). (Note that the first 
three channels address the “democratic deficit”, while the fourth is closely related to the prob-
lem-solving conception of legitimacy). Lastly, Føllesdal enumerates six objects or levels of 
legitimacy: Particular political decisions, political actors, public institutions, the regime, the 
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regime principles and the political community. Although such a conceptual clarification might 
seem to provide alternative and perhaps complementary perspectives, the unfortunate fact is 
that the specific recommendations and their practical-political consequences too frequently 
stand in contradiction; as Føllesdal notes, “efficiency, democracy and constitutionalism may 
obviously conflict, even in principle” (ibid: 452).6
For example, the notions of output or performance legitimacy, adopted especially for the 
“technocratic vision” of European governance (Beetham and Lord 1998: 16–22), explicitly 
emphasize expert knowledge and the deliberate depoliticisation of EU decision-making proc-
ess in the name of “ideological neutrality”. However, as will be argued in more length below, 
the nature of any political decision-making is simply political, which in the end means nor-
mative. Eschewing what Beetham and Lord call democratic authorization, accountability and 
representation (ibid: 26–28, 59–93) might aid in reducing the performance deficit, but hardly 
helps in combating the democratic one. As such, it is at best ambivalent with regard to the 
condition of political obligation (see above). Similarly, E.O. Eriksen and J.E. Fossum argue 
that the problem-solving conception of legitimacy, embodied in the so-called “permissive 
consensus” (where, in short, the EU was legitimized as long as it was able to “solve problems 
effectively and efficiently, and […] to deliver goods that people demand”) cannot by itself 
deliver “trust-generating values”. According to them the question remains, “What are the 
outcomes for?” (Eriksen and Fossum 2007: 4).
Føllesdal suggests that the task of overcoming the “trust-gap” or “compliance-gap”, in 
the absence of a thick collective identity or a clearly delineated common good, requires both 
(a) institutions which are simple and transparent, and at the same time effective and efficient, 
and (b) public political theory or philosophy “regarding the objectives and normative stand-
ards of the political order, such as democracy, subsidiarity, solidarity and human rights” (ibid: 
456–457). The latter, a kind of “story” of European integration, is directly concerned with 
alleged common values and their interpretation and will be discussed later. 
Stressing the role of institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 
should not be overstated though. Because their creation is closely linked to changes and 
general “progress” in the realm of fundamental European treaties (until recently, these de-
velopments had an explicitly constitutional flavour), institutionalism faces the same “inher-
ent risk” as over-reliance on constitutionalism: As one author puts it, there is a danger of “
a reified constitutional discourse which consciously seeks to ‘alienate’ legal subjects.” (Ward 
2001: 37). We need not fully embrace the discourse of critical legal studies, where the phrase 
has its roots; the point is still clear: The “legalistic twilight” inherent in the “meta-narrative” 
of constitutions and treaties and exhibited in continuous attempts to “compose yet another 
random scattering of rights in a shiny new Charter” (ibid: 32) misses the real issue, which is 
persuading citizens of EU member states of the meaningfulness of further deepening Euro-
pean integration. The worry that “The more [the citizen] waits for the law, the more he forgets 
why” (ibid: 39), is in this sense fitting.7 Overstating legality is, in this sense, similar to over-
stating performance as the principal basis of legitimacy.
Is there then a “substrate” upon which the story of European integration could be erected? 
This will be the main concern of the following two sections.
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2. Identity and Nations in an Enlarged Europe
We can now consider the issue of trust and legitimacy “from below”. I have already pointed 
out that widespread trust in others’ compliance, as well as trustworthiness of institutions, is an 
essential component of the legitimate and stable exercise of power. This is especially relevant 
for the EU, whose official motto is “United in Diversity”: It is widely recognized that the 
more numerous and diverse a group of people is, the lower the degree of altruism and mutual 
identification, which in turn negatively affects their sense of solidarity and willingness to co-
operate (Lehning 2001: 256). Some authors would even argue that societal trust requires thick 
collective identity as its precondition (cf. Miller 1995). Nevertheless, European citizenship, 
construed as a liberal-democratic one, and proposed as a potential solution to the “trust/com-
pliance gap” problem (cf. Lehning 2001: 257; Tully 2002) cannot rest solely on a legal basis 
and do without the element of common identity, as was already hinted above. Here the issue 
of national attachments comes into the picture.
In his article on cosmopolitanism and nationalism/statism, Brian Barry borrows a few lines 
from James Joyce’s Ulysses that depict Leopold Bloom’s understanding of the concept of na-
tion and nationality (Barry 1999: 12). In short, Bloom claimed his nation (that is, nationality) 
was Irish because he was born in Ireland, which came naturally to him. Although Barry pro-
ceeded to sharply criticize nationalism and statism from a liberal cosmopolitan perspective, 
I will utilize his well chosen citation for a slightly different end.
Would an ordinary citizen of, say, France, speak differently today than Leopold Bloom did? 
This question should not be dismissed merely because it is allegedly entrenched in “meth-
odological nationalism”, or because it rests on the (implausible) fiction of a “closed society”, 
popularized recently by John Rawls (Benhabib 2002: 101–102; cf. Rawls 1993: 41). That 
would represent a disconnect between much of the academic treatment of national identities, 
couched in “post-national” terms and sometimes highly critical of the object of its research 
(cf. Habermas 1998; Hedetoft and Hjort 2002a) on one hand, and on the other, real-world 
processes and developments, which speak in a voice rather different from normative post-
national theorizing. This conclusion is strikingly similar to that of Brian Barry, who criticizes 
“academic nationalists” for defending a benign “civic” ideal, which is decisively remote from 
grass-root realities (Barry 1999). The problem lies in the fact that feelings of belonging to 
a certain group and/or place are defined affectively, not cognitively, and as such resist rational 
rejection as being “outdated”, a “matter of the past”, and so on; “Europeanness” then cannot 
serve “as an emotionally convincing substitute for nationality, no matter how intellectually 
and morally appealing such wider identifications might be” (Hedetoft and Hjort 2002b: xviii). 
Feelings of “belonging to the EU” remain at best diffuse, notwithstanding the economic suc-
cess of the European Community (Abélès 2000: 44), so there is a strong prima facie reason 
to take national loyalties seriously. The complicated process of forging national identities and 
allegiances is centuries-long and while no one claims this long-term process to be entirely 
just, its results (i.e. nations and territorially defined states) nevertheless have a firm place in 
the modern political vocabulary.8 
At this point, several possible strands of counter-argument may be put forward. (1) The 
critic might raise an array of objections to the very concepts of nation and nationalism, for ex-
ample that nation-states are not in fact nation-states, in the sense that the equation 1 nation=1 
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state never holds; that such territorially enclosed entities only exacerbate inter-ethnic frictions 
due to unequal relations between majorities and minorities; the fact that for a committed lib-
eral, the very talk of “nations” in one line with “individuals” represents a certain recipe for 
a headache (cf. Barry 1999); that crucial existential questions of one’s life are better served 
by religion or self-reflection than by national attachments; that there is nothing ontologically 
or morally necessary about nationalism, and so on.9 These are relevant issues, but it is beyond 
the purpose of this article to try to judge, for example, whether liberal nationalism is an oxy-
moron or a magic formula (cf. Tamir 1993; McKim and McMahan 1997; Beiner 1999; Patten 
1999). Suffice it to say that nationalism is almost certainly not a matter of the past. At present, 
there are many national selves, some cosmopolitan/post-national, and many others yet to be 
constituted; this is what matters with respect to democratic decision-making. Therefore, it is 
much more plausible to claim that nationalism should at least take on a “civic”, as opposed 
to “ethnic” form.
(2) A similar reply is available to the charge that my exposition is guilty of an unjustified 
assumption that national and European identities stand in some kind of a-priori mutually 
exclusive relation, or in other words, that I tacitly – either intentionally or unknowingly – 
ignore the possibility of multiple and/or overlapping identities, by creating an artificial dis-
tinction between the two. As a distinguished author puts it, there is “nothing contradictory 
about being Scottish, British and European, or, transcending civilizations, feeling Muslim and 
European (…),” since “feelings of belonging to a European, national or regional community 
are not mutually exclusive” (van Gerven 2005: 50–51). This seems to be especially valid for 
the younger generation(s), eliciting hopes that “we can expect to see a rising tide of popular 
support for globalisation and for the EU in future decades” (Norris 2002: 1, quoted in van 
Gerven 2005: 49). 
What to make of these claims? First, I believe that the alleged non-exclusivity of identifica-
tion with different levels of political community depends to a large extent on the way the ques-
tions in various surveys are formulated: For example, it is one thing to tick predefined boxes, 
asking whether one feels somehow “European” or not, and another to express actual feelings 
toward the citizens of other countries. The problem lies in the fact that when speaking about 
European values and European identity, people usually accentuate their aspirational aspects 
while suppressing the necessary exclusionary ones. Take, for example, the Buttiglione case, 
the result of which has been (among others) that issues of private morality do not belong in 
Europe/European politics (Bialasiewicz et al. 2005; cf. Holmes 2001). How then to establish 
the link between the public and private spheres? Who decides on the conditions of inclusion 
and exclusion? And what stance to take vis-à-vis doctrines for which the separation of ethics 
and politics is inconceivable?10
My second remark is related: Although individuals can hold multiple identities, “Europe” 
and “Europeanness” mean different things for people in different countries. Subsequently, the 
content of their image of “Europe” is likely to reproduce their own values, so that Europe as 
conceived by the Germans looks more or less Germanic, while for the British, Europe repre-
sents “the Other” against which they define themselves. As it has been argued on the basis of 
social psychological research, the rise of European identification among citizens of European 
countries might in fact result in less positive evaluations of their respective nations, complicat-
ing rather than facilitating tolerance and mutual respect (Risse 2002).
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My general point is that there are certain identities which do not overlap, and which are not 
easily accommodated, even less so at the European level. Many hard cases (to borrow a term 
from legal theory) pop out as soon as one starts to think of European politics as truly Europe-
wide – cases which have no clear solution even within the territorially defined member states 
of the EU, counting out simple majority decisions. What precisely is so magical about EU 
decision-making that these controversial issues cease to be controversial?11
3. Constitutional Patriotism and Common Values
(3) Instead of plunging into the complex debate on the pros and cons of nationalism, it could 
be argued that there is no need to retain the language of nationalism itself. In other words 
– Why bother much with existing loyalties and identities? Should it not be possible to construct 
European identity, European citizenry, just as most national identities have been constructed 
(cf. Thiess 2007)? This is what Jürgen Habermas and others have argued for. There is pre-
sumably an implicit set of common political values that cut across national communities and 
which these communities could accept if expressed explicitly, which in turn would lead to 
a gradual emergence of an awareness of being European – a so-called “constitutional patriot-
ism” (Habermas 2001; cf. Habermas 1996a: part III).
It is important to distinguish the plea for constitutional patriotism and its offshoots from 
another “great European narrative”, which looks rather to the past in order to unearth some 
kind of common history. Such attempts, embodied for example in the Preamble of the rejected 
Constitutional Treaty, aim to create a new retrospective myth, a kind of a European “Dream”, 
that has found its latest expression in the process of European integration – a firm step in the 
direction of an abstract “common destiny” that is unique to the peoples of Europe. But there 
have been as many fault lines in European history as common heritage in ideals, dreams and 
visions, and a selective reading of European history is hardly more acceptable than a selective 
reading of national histories (cf. Beck and Grande 2004: 164). Besides that, it has been ar-
gued that by “simply dismissing various elements of nationalism in toto” that were presum-
ably among the causes of the bloody European past, post-national theorizing does itself “no 
favours” since the ethnic element – missing at the European level – has been instrumental 
in buttressing the growth of democratic regimes in Europe, with all the ancillary achieve-
ments such as the rule of law, human rights or political equality (Chalmers 2006: 440–441). 
Put more straightforwardly, the relation between nation/nationalism and democracy is most 
probably conceptual, not merely a historically contingent one (Lacroix 2005: 1). Also, as one 
author notes, such visionary justifications of European integration go well beyond the bulk 
of contemporary political philosophy, which “seek[s] to ground arguments on [such] daily 
concerns” – be it immigration, unemployment, relations with the developing world and so 
on (Eleftheriadis 2004: 9).12 So the theoretical construction of common identity, if it is not to 
rest on dubious “great narratives”, has to be particularly convincing in order to support deeper 
political integration of the EU.
Is the appeal to constitutional patriotism, preferably stripped of the historical-visionary 
baggage, and focused rather on the concept of political culture, a promising path to common 
identity? I suspect that, on its own, it cannot do the job it is expected to. The reason is threefold:
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(A) First, political values such as freedom or social equality are rather empty and likely 
non-functional without a shared cultural and historical horizon. While the latest Eurobarom-
eter survey on European cultural values suggests that there are several values that a majority 
of Europeans generally agree on (peace, social equality and solidarity, respect for nature and 
environment, freedom of opinion etc.), it also shows that a small majority of respondents 
(53%) believe that there is “no common European culture, because European countries are too 
different from one another” (European Commission 2007).
The original objectives of the EC/EU might be summed up as (1) peace in Europe, (2) inte-
gration of Germany and (3) economic prosperity (Habermas 2001: 2–8). Peace and economic 
well-being are universally acceptable values/objectives both from the perspective of EU-in-
siders and EU-outsiders. The problem with them is that they do not seem appealing enough to 
hold European diversity together; or more precisely, it is not at all clear that they point in the 
direction of further integration, let alone of any sufficiently robust European identity, and do 
not by themselves offer any clear guidance for common policy.
A more detailed and up-to-date list is to be found in the Maastricht Treaty, as amended 
by the Lisbon Treaty and the rejected Constitutional Treaty, both of which contain a list of 
values and objectives assumed to be “European” (Treaty on European Union: Preamble, Title 
I; Constitution for Europe: Art. I-2, I-3; cf. Lisbon Treaty):
Values: Liberty, Democracy, Human Rights (including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities), Individual Freedom, Rule of Law, Human Dignity, Pluralism, Tolerance, Social 
Justice, Equality, Solidarity, Non-Discrimination etc.
Objectives: Promoting peace, economic growth, solidarity between generations, respecting 
cultural and linguistic diversity, protection of human rights, eradication of poverty, combating 
social exclusion and discrimination etc.
These seem to be pretty obvious “positive” values that are worth striving for and that over-
lap with what the individual member-countries as well as their individual citizens endorse. 
However these are highly abstract concepts, which remain empty without further interpreta-
tion. All of these values represent contested concepts and some of them even essentially con-
tested concepts, that is, concepts we all agree that are good (or bad) but necessarily disagree on 
the criteria for their application. Take for example the values of Democracy, Tolerance, Social 
Justice, Equality or Human Rights. A glimpse over the recent history of political thought 
reveals that no agreement exists; on the contrary, powerful arguments have been put forward 
by each of the major schools (or representatives) of political philosophy (cf. Kymlicka 2002). 
There is a heated debate over what social justice requires, pitting, for example, mainstream 
liberals (liberal egalitarians) against successors of the radical-democratic tradition (Young 
1990; Anderson 1999). Similarly, theories of democracy offer different accounts of the desired 
arrangement of a democratic community (cf. Held 2006). As for tolerance, there is the long-
standing issue of whether to tolerate – in the name of normative multiculturalism – illiberal 
practices of certain identity-based groups within a general liberal framework. Equality is an 
extremely tricky concept; even such an ostensibly uncontroversial conception as “equality of 
opportunity” is a victim of much indeterminacy (Arneson 1995; cf. Sen 1992). Or sticking 
with multiculturalism, is it right (fair) to treat certain groups favourably (i.e. treat others un-
equally), so that their members feel as equals in a democratic society? Some would consider 
it a criminal betrayal of fundamental liberal values.13 
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In other words, the values included in these documents are too general and hollow to 
ground any substantial moral allegiances, or as it has been termed, “entries in a collective 
dictionary”. Some even speak about a hypertrophy of values that makes their declaration 
“diffuse and powerless” (von Bogdandy 2005: 298, 310; van Gerven 2005: 56). Let me 
take a concrete example of why this is so: The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with 
its roughly 40% share of the EU budget, most likely does not correspond with principles of 
economic liberalism, besides being widely known to be a heavy burden in terms of fiscal 
policy. Quotas limiting the permitted area of vineyards in member countries speak a similar 
language as agricultural subsidies to certain regions. However, Art. I-3 of the rejected Consti-
tutional Treaty speaks about “free and undistorted competition” in the internal market. Now 
my point is not to defend economic liberalism, but to express astonishment that this is not 
understood and interpreted as a political issue that has roots in a systematic theoretical and 
normative account of what is right and wrong in a society – specifically, how a just society 
distributes the goods produced. Rather, such policies are usually presented as some kind of 
“technical” decisions driven by unspecified “necessities” of European citizens and/or firms. 
In other words, European politics is in this sense highly depoliticized, as if the asserted com-
mon values had unique substance once and for all – which is simply not true (cf. Beetham and 
Lord 1998: 20). Policy decisions are not value-free simply in virtue of being made on the EU 
level, and the supposed “ideological neutrality” is only a case of wishful thinking. My earlier 
discussion of the performance vs. democratic aspects of legitimacy can be applied here: Since 
there is no such thing as non-political political decision-making, there is again a prima facie 
reason to ask how and from whom its legitimacy stems. Returning to Habermas for example, 
it is not at all clear why the privileged philosophy of the EU should be social democratic. 
Are other philosophies or ideological visions of a good society somehow “less European” 
(Eleftheriadis 2004: 8)?
(B) We can now consider the second difficulty with political values: Namely that their 
existence in a pure form is a myth, no less than narratives of the foundations of national iden-
tities. As Bernard Yack remarks, the first half of Ernest Renan’s famous definition of a nation 
as “a daily plebiscite”, which points to the key role of “rich legacy of memories”, has been 
too often left out in order to highlight the individual and consensual aspect of certain common 
identities (Yack 1999: 107; Renan 1882). Even a politically defined community will articulate 
certain cultural norms, such as the date of bank holidays, official language(s), school cur-
ricula or limits for immigration. The United States, universally considered to be a paradigm 
of politically defined citizenship, is a case in point, for example with regard to their school 
system.14
(C) Lastly, even if a viable political conception could be found or constructed, it would not 
follow that full inclusion has been guaranteed, or that the problem of membership (citizenship) 
has been solved: For (i) certain individuals or groups may (and do) consciously oppose values 
such as freedom of opinion or religion, or may disagree with the boundaries of such freedom, 
and (ii) they still would not be disqualified from citizenship – because citizenship rights are 
simply not conditioned upon general political principles, but upon such principles such as 
one’s place of birth and/or line of descent.
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4. Transforming Political Theory and Society
The upshot of the previous paragraphs is that a political conception of identity does not 
represent a unique solution to the problem of European identity. But there is still another 
way to cope with shared identities: (4) Denying that the traditional conceptual apparatus 
of western political theory is capable of capturing contemporary developments. Since the 
EU is a political system sui generis, old recipes and methods lose their ground and le-
gitimacy.15 According to Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, unless we (political and social 
theorists) dispose of categories such as nation, state, sovereignty etc., our understanding 
of European integration will be necessarily erroneous and deformed – for example in the 
sense that the relation between European-level and state-level political institutions will be 
perceived as a zero-sum game, i.e. as either-or, instead of both-and (Beck and Grande 2004: 
27, 245).
Beck and Grande’s departure point is again a critique of methodological nationalism in 
social and political theory which precludes embracing a dynamic perspective on European 
integration and traps one in a “Europe-blind”, zero-sum game perspective, incapable of cap-
turing the epochal societal transformation currently taking place. Against what they call the 
National, Neoliberal and Technocratic “Lies” (Lebenslügen) distorting our perception of pos-
sible European trajectories, Beck and Grande put forward an ambitious theory of a reflective 
cosmopolitism, a realistic utopia (also called cosmopolitan realism by the authors) that will 
enable embedding European integration in the more general context of reflective moderniza-
tion. In this way, “old” and presumably obsolete distinctions – the so-called duals and coordi-
nates – such as inside × outside, national × international, society × politics or we × the others 
will be eroded and eventually disposed of (ibid: 51). The resulting theoretical project, which 
mirrors the desired direction of European cooperation, is what Beck and Grande call Cosmo-
politan Europe. The process of Europeanization then reappears as a regional model case of 
globalization (both understood obviously in the “correct way”), and as such does not, should 
not and in fact cannot have any unambiguously defined borders both inwards and outwards.16 
Such a perspective allows the authors to perceive the EU as a limitlessly open and inclusive 
entity, which at the same time accommodates and dialectically lifts up the many divisions 
and seemingly exclusive identities – and most interestingly – also does so vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world.
Beck and Grande explicitly claim that their attack on methodological nationalism steers 
clear of its counterpart in “methodological Europeanism”. They also claim that through their 
“story of Europe”, they do not aim to adopt a “universalistic view”, and that their understand-
ing of Europe does not amount to a construction of a “cosmopolitan philosophy”. By setting 
their “cosmopolitan realism” between globalism and nationalism, they wish to avoid “Euro-
centric normative universalism”. But it is doubtful whether one can coherently speak about 
Europe as a post-hegemonic Empire based on a universalistic and open logic of functioning, 
presenting this project of “newly thought Europe” as a solution to the numerous problems of 
the “world risk society”, as well as stating explicitly that political realism prescribes to subor-
dinate the interests of nation-states to cosmopolitan aims (such as procurement of democracy 
and freedom; ibid: 325), while claiming that such a project is free from cosmopolitan norma-
tive pretensions.
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Beck and Grande put a lot of emphasis on the pioneering role of judicial activity, which, 
through the precedential decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), has indeed ac-
quired a position of central importance to European integration. However, faith in the ECJ’s 
spearheading role in this respect is ill-founded. As it has been put, “courts are imperfect ve-
hicles for expressing either a national or European community view that reveals how citizens 
identify with each other at either level” (Bellamy and Castiglione 2003: 24). Courts cannot by 
themselves ensure the internal legitimacy of a given polity. Decisions about common foreign 
policy, agricultural policy, educational system, tax system, criminal issues, policy of equal 
opportunities etc. are political by nature, and as such cannot be justified by vague reference to 
ECJ-guaranteed “norms”, within which the desired “discovery of Europe” (Er-findung Euro-
pas) is to take place. Again, solidarity might be a value shared generally by the vast majority 
of European countries and their citizens, but it is much less clear what it means with regard to 
their pension or health care systems. Decisions of this kind require legitimacy, which in turn 
requires trust. To drive the point home, trust can be built neither around highly abstract val-
ues and/or principles, nor on the findings of the ECJ. The project of “Cosmopolitan Europe” 
therefore tells us very little with regard to issues that are crucial for decision-making on the 
European level. Thorny and persistent problems (cf. Beck and Grande 2004: 148–150) will 
not be solved by labelling them as “outdated” and “backward-looking”, or by dissolving them 
in a dialectical conceptual “game”.
The proposed erosion of antiquated conceptual distinctions being put forward as a solution 
to the incongruence between concept and reality that forms the root of the “misinterpretation 
of Europe” suffers from a similar weakness: In the quest for “inclusive duals” based on the 
both-and logic, the concepts are emptied of their meaning, and thus lose their descriptive and 
explanatory significance. I do not believe that celebrating the Mehrdeutigkeit (equivocation) 
of concepts, as opposed to their (allegedly obsolete) Eindeutigkeit (non-ambiguity) is the right 
way to go, because it prevents clear thinking about what is at stake (cf. Gaus 2000). The EU 
might be a sui generis entity, however, political concepts such as equality, interest, justice, 
sovereignty, power or identity retain their content – a much disputed content of course, but 
that does not amount to a wholesale rejection of “old political theory”.17 As I have argued 
above, European politics is also about power and distribution, no matter how much effort is 
put into dialectical denials of this fact, and in such a game there are always winners and los-
ers. Beck and Grande are also wrong when they claim that politics on the EU level rests on 
a culture of consensus (Beck and Grande 2004: 110, 121), because it is at best a culture of 
compromise – and the difference lies not only in spelling. More generally, the dialectics of 
both-and cannot obscure existing divergent interests and identities, for example in the realm of 
energy policies, educational systems or minority policies. Claiming that “Europe is character-
ized by what it is not” (ibid: 284–285) will take us only that far.
Margaret Canovan notes that the fact that so-called “nation-states” have so often failed 
to live up to the ideals that buttress them does not authorize one to claim that some kind of 
supra-national entity should step in and “take care”, that is, create and embrace “a rich plural-
ity of semi-autonomous communities presided over by a benevolent but impartial regional 
authority,” because “the most likely effect of any such attempt at a divorce between the com-
munal and the political would be to further politicize communal identity, while depriving the 
political structure of an affective support it needs to be able to command allegiance” (Canovan 
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1996: 117). Here we again stumble upon the affective dimension of citizenship, which can-
not be supplanted by rationalist (legal and political), top-down, elite-driven constructions of 
a “new Europe” (cf. Fossum 2003: 337).
At the very least, there is something to Canovan’s scepticism as there is to Beck and 
Grande’s optimism, and with respect to what is at stake, one should not feel ashamed to 
take the “jeopardy” attitude (Hirschman 1991), so frowned upon by the progressive theorists 
among which Beck and Grande certainly belong. Of course this is not to say that the 20th-
century “nation-state” marks the end of history. The EU is indeed an experiment in the making 
and no general and preferably empirically validated theory is at hand. Because nations are 
not entirely homogenous and exclusionary entities, we can speak about forging a common 
overarching identity. One of the paths toward this goal might be something reminiscent of 
a Rawlsian “overlapping consensus” on a list of values and/or principles, and if we accept the 
claim that “European awareness” is rising, especially among the younger generations, then 
the long-term perspective looks rather more optimistic.18 However, I remain quite reserved 
with regard to a top-down construction of European citizenry, accompanied by a doubtful 
“culture of uncertain urgency” on the part of European elites, aiming to “[go] forward with-
out looking behind” and “digesting events without considering all of their consequences” 
(Abélès 2000: 32–33).19
5. Fortress Europe or Pace-Setter?
Beck and Grande’s drive for a “Cosmopolitan Europe” invites us to consider the final issue, 
and that is the place of the “new Europe” in the wider scheme of global politics. Or put differ-
ently, what kind of relationship exists between the internal dynamics of European integration 
and the role of the EU on the international scene (cf. Bickerton 2007: 25). Gerard Delanty 
has proposed a fourfold typology of European identity that stretches across the space defined 
by the universalistic and particularistic poles (Delanty 2002). On the universalistic side, he 
identifies “moral universalism” and “post-national patriotism”, both of which are decidedly 
thin identities – the former embracing universal norms such as human rights, justice or hu-
manitarianism, while the latter stresses a distinctive legal dimension of European integration. 
The related political/philosophical traditions are liberal democracy and civic republicanism, 
respectively. On the particularistic side, Delanty puts “cultural particularism”, which leans 
heavily towards symbolic and ethnocentric conceptions of Europe, and “European pragma-
tism”, which is instrumental in its nature and feeds off “economic and social aspects of life” 
(Delanty 2002: 351). The respective traditions in this case are Euro-federalism (or commu-
nitarianism) and social democracy. Delanty suggests steering a middle course by combin-
ing the second and fourth models, which “share a certain kind of openness that is consistent 
with cultural pluralisation and reflexivity” and retain transformative potential (ibid: 353). 
Such an alternative identity allows, according to Delanty, for a “possible reconciliation” of 
universalism and particularism. European Cosmopolitanism, as Delanty calls it, would then 
emerge from the awareness of “conflicts, traumas and fears” of the European past, rather 
than searching for a “transEuropean cultural heritage” (ibid). The discursively established, 
reflexive European Cosmopolitanism could be internally thickened by recourse to Social 
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Democratic values, which differentiate Europe from the USA and the majority of the rest of 
the world. Universal principles are thus particularised through concrete European experience, 
while specifically European “ways of life” are de-particularised in the process of reflection 
and dialogue.
Although this tells us little about the actual content of EU foreign policy, the author’s op-
position to the particularistic model of “Fortress Europe” (embodied especially in the third 
model) is apparent. This “drive” is even stronger in the case of Beck and Grande, who present 
us with an image of a principally open, border-less and inclusive political entity, whose expan-
sion is fundamentally unconstrained. When they finally although quite briefly discuss what 
they call the “dilemma of universalism”, that is, what set of norms should define Europe vis-à-
vis the rest of the world, who should decide on this set and whether it has to remain procedural 
or acquire certain substantial content, they eventually settle on human rights as a necessary 
minimum, which is after all complementary to Empire-building. Thus a new kind of a Men-
schenrechts-Empire (Human Rights Empire) ought to emerge, whose universalistic ambitions 
are unambiguous; while of course retaining tolerance and respect for diversity and Otherness 
(Beck and Grande, 2004: 385 an). Their cosmopolitism bases itself “on a framework of norms 
that are connectional and binding for all, with the help of which a slip into a post-modern 
particularism should be prevented (ibid: 28–29).
It is legitimate to assume that if Delanty’s European cosmopolitanism is to retain any aspi-
rations of moral universalism, human rights will be again a serious candidate, although actual 
foreign policy principles will probably be more ambitious, along the lines of the amended 
Maastricht Treaty.20 In any case, human rights and possibly democracy seem to be among 
the core principles defining the EU vis-à-vis the rest of the world, upon which it can build 
its pace-setting role. Similar conclusions are in fact also reached by Eriksen and Fossum 
(2007: 13–14) upon considering several cosmopolitan accounts of the future of European 
democracy.
However, the perceived self-evidence of universal human rights cannot withstand closer 
scrutiny. Even if I we leave aside the contested issues of the grounds and the scope of human 
rights (cf. Cranston 1973; Gewirth 1979; Shue 1996; Donnelly 2003; Ferrara 2003), it might 
be plausibly argued that human rights represent a consequence of the functioning of liberal 
democratic polities, not their causes, which means that the conceptual separation of human 
rights and democracy is not so easy (Brown 1999: 111). Although there might be an ostensi-
ble planetary consensus on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that does not tell us 
much about the actual level of human rights fulfilment. Many governments are paying only 
lip-service to it, for a simple reason: Unless these human rights become legally and not only 
morally binding, we cannot expect their fulfilment in countries that do not possess a liberal 
democratic legal order. The “mobilization of shame” may help in specific cases of human 
rights violations, but structurally, the connection between the widest possible fulfilment of hu-
man rights as they appear in the UDHR and a functioning liberal democratic polity seems to be 
empirically true.21 This is a somewhat schizophrenic position – the EU would wish to promote 
a supposedly universal principle, but not as a full package, which would be too reminiscent 
of its ethnocentric imperial past. However, the UDHR and related Covenants do represent 
a comprehensive account of a good society, not a “necessary minimum” – which tends to get 
overlooked because the international community struggles to uphold even core human rights, 
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such as the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. 
One would find it difficult then to conceive of human rights as a defining feature of Europe 
in the wider context of global politics, official declarations notwithstanding. This theoretical 
quagmire is further complicated by real-world tension between EU’s pretensions to pursue 
a unified pan-European foreign policy in the name of European “people”, and the mode of its 
creation and legitimization, which remains entrenched in the discourse of “damage limitation” 
oriented towards “mere” coordination of national foreign policy priorities (Bickerton 2007).
Is there anything which could characterise the EU as a global player, besides its economic 
strength, military weakness, economic protectionism, strict migration policy and moralistic 
jargon (see the recent proposal of the European Parliament to put a worldwide moratorium 
on the death penalty through the UN General Assembly)? Are the EU’s core principles and 
values capable of transcending cultural and geographical borders, making it a global leader? 
In a Rawlsian world governed by a liberal Law of Peoples such questions would be perhaps 
superfluous, because the normative principles of international politics are exhausted in this 
model by a fairly short list of fundamental human rights, and a duty of assistance to the “bur-
dened societies”, thus approximating with certain qualifications the current state of affairs 
(Rawls, 2001). More ambitious visions of a future world order, on the other hand, such as 
those projected by Beck and Grande, Held (1995), Tan (2000), Pogge (2002), Caney (2005) 
or Moellendorf (2002) would push the EU into a much more demanding position – in order to 
spearhead, for example, reform of the United Nations, procure the UDHR as an “indivisible 
whole”, or establish an effective global judicial system. This is, however, not a task suitable 
for a political entity that is shy of openly embracing its supposed cosmopolitan mission, that 
builds – or is advised to build – its identity partly in opposition to the naïve and dangerous 
idealism of the USA, and struggles to establish its internal legitimacy.
6. Conclusion
Whether the project of political unification is viable, and whether a politically united EU will 
be able to take the position of a global “pace-setter” with respect to its core defining values 
and principles, remains to be seen. In this paper I have tried to restate some of the links be-
tween the concepts of legitimacy, identity and common values which I hope shed light on the 
complex internal nature of European integration and the inherent problems it faces. Of course, 
these issues deserve more detailed treatment than I have been able to offer here. Let me con-
clude the text with an example of why it makes sense, in my view, to look into the past, or at 
least the present, and not just forward. The EU’s celebrated openness to ethnic, religious and 
value diversity has recently given way to rather traditional concerns over the unity and stabil-
ity of member-state societies. To use a much-favoured watchword of the last decade, norma-
tive multiculturalism has been to a large extent replaced by a concern for civic toleration and 
its limits (Barša and Baršová 2005), which is again a classical notion of political theory, no 
matter what some authors have said about its obsolescence and uselessness. What I have tried 
to arrive at is a belief that, with respect to the main points of this paper, normative self-restraint 
is a precondition for thinking more clearly about and acting more realistically upon the chal-
lenges that the EU is, and will continue to be, confronted with.
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Notes
   1. See Lord and Magnette 2002: 24, who argue, with regard to the issue of legitimacy, that the EU 
“appears more like a laboratory for changes that are more or less present elsewhere than as a sui 
generis system.”
   2. My aim here is not to provide an exhaustive account of metatheoretical debates on the concept of 
legitimacy in relation to the EU. Rather, I wish to concentrate on certain aspects of the concept, 
which seem especially relevant to me. Admittedly, as one reviewer has observed, such an approach 
does not do full justice to several interesting works and /or perspectives, such as Lord and Magnette 
2002; Eriksen and Fossum 2004 and 2007; Scharpf 1999 and others. However, a full-fledged ac-
count would reach well beyond the intentions of the article, and would deserve a separate and more 
focused treatment.
   3. The concept of legitimacy has, of course, a rich intellectual history. One reviewer suggested in-
clusion of an overview of this wider theoretical framework, in order to make the following text 
somewhat more “nested”. Due to space constraints (and partly to reasons outlined in the previous 
footnote), I leave it to the kind reader to consult the classical contributions by Max Weber (1919), 
Carl Schmitt (2004 [1932]) or Jürgen Habermas (1996b) (to stick with some of the suggested 
authors)
   4. These include formal criteria – (1) de jure compatibility with international law (polity) and (2) legal-
ity, or regular system of governance which is not arbitrary (regime), as well as substantive criteria 
– (3) the polity’s viable existence does not entail oppression of insiders or outsiders (polity), and 
finally (4) the regime not being oppressive, unjust or incompetent (regime). Bellamy and Castigli-
one 2003: 10–11.
   5. Føllesdal speaks of four different concepts, however I believe that the distinction between an over-
arching concept and its various interpretations (that is, conceptions) is useful here. For the original 
exposition see Gallie 1956; cf. also Gaus 2000: 26–32.
   6. Cf. Lord and Magnette 2002: 13–14 for a similar comment, although they are more optimistic with 
regard to resolving such conflicts, or even to their conduciveness to establishing a functional demo-
cratic polity
   7. The quote comes from Franz Kafka’s The Trial. Again, I do not want to pursue Ward’s argument to 
the proposed “leap beyond constitutionalism” and similar radical conclusions. 
   8. For one possible account, admittedly ambitious and complex, see Flora 1999.
   9. Of the many critical accounts of nationalism and its defences in political theory, Bhikhu Parekh 
sums up nicely the most important points in his ‘The Incoherence of Nationalism’; see Parekh 
1999.
 10. Asking these questions, we are back in the realm theoretical discussions that have in recent decades 
dominated the landscape of political philosophy, such as the ethical neutrality of the liberal state or 
the exclusion of comprehensive moral doctrines from political deliberation.
 11. This claim could be further strengthened by noting that there is a crucial component of modern 
politics that is too often ignored in academic debates on European politics and identity – and that 
is the issue of power. A sober reflection such as “What is totally lost from view is that politics, 
even “new” European politics, is about power and distribution (…)” (Weiss and Wodak 2000: 49, 
emphasis added; cf. van Schendelen 2002), is quite rare. However, political power and the model 
of economic (re)distribution traditionally stand in need of justification and popular authorisation. 
This is the very domain of political philosophy, concerned with substantiating and/or rebutting argu-
ments for certain normative rules and principles.
 12. Beck and Grande, whose work will be discussed shortly, suggest the exact opposite – to rediscover 
“great goals of great politics”. Beck and Grande 2004: 240.
 13. For one of the most eloquent and entertaining elaborations of this “hard-nosed” liberal attitude see 
Barry, 2001. Kymlicka 1995 makes a case for the opposite approach.
 14. For an extended discussion of the case of the USA see Macedo 2000.
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 15. Such a general attitude may of course take various forms. See, among others, Beck and Grande 
2004; Moravcsik 2001; von Bogdandy 2005: 296; Rosenfeld 2005.
 16. This is, in a nutshell, Beck and Grande’s reply to the issue of further expansion of the EU.
 17. For a discussion of EU decision-making centering on the concepts of sovereignty and legitimacy, 
see Belling 2008.
 18. For the original exposition see Rawls 1987. For an extensive use of this concept for the issue of 
European identity, see Lehning, 2001. It should be noted, though, that Rawls developed the concept 
of the overlapping consensus in close connection with the concept (“idea”) of public reason. This 
concept requires a certain degree of public consensus on political values and principles, as well as 
a “public sphere” where citizens’ deliberation is to take place. None of these is presently at hand in 
the EU, and in this respect this particular mode of legitimization presupposes the solution it is meant 
to provide. Cf. Rawls 1999; Larmore 1993; Lord and Magnette 2002: 16.
 19. The process of Europeanization of political parties is a promising channel of establishing a common 
“field of issues”, for example in the form of newly emerging “European” cleavages within the party 
system(s), while retaining a crucial instrument or channel of democratic legitimization. Again, how-
ever, this is predominantly a “bottom-up” process. Cf. Flora et al. 1999; Ladrech 2002; Featherstone 
and Radaelli 2003; Poguntke 2007.
 20. “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by principles which have inspired its 
own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: de-
mocracy, rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of 
the United Nations Charter and international law.” Art. 21 of the amended Maastricht Treaty.
 21. And perhaps not only empirically: As Andrew Hurrell notes, if taken in its complexity, the human 
rights agenda cannot be logically disengaged from comprehensive accounts of good society (Hurrell 
1999: 280.).
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